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I have very little expertise in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA)1 or in the underlying constitutional law of freedom of religion that
RFRA seeks to codify. I therefore venture into the debate surrounding Douglas
NeJaime and Reva B. Siegel's Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience
Claims in Religion and Politics2 with some diffidence, and primarily to respond
to Douglas Laycock's specific argument that NeJaime and Siegel advance a
position that is inconsistent with the First Amendment rights of freedom of
expression of religious objectors.3
I. THE CONTROVERSY
NeJaime and Siegel's article is an effort to understand how best to interpret
and apply RFRA, which provides:
(a) In general. Government shall not substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Exception. Government may substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the
burden to the person-
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
1. 4 2 U.S.C. § 2ooobb-l(a)-(b) (2012).
2. Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in
Religion and Politics, i24YALE L.J. 2516 (2oi).
3. Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty for Politically Active Minority Groups: A Response to
NeJaime and Siegel, 125 YALu L.J. F. 369 (2o16).
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(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.4
NeJaime and Siegel argue that in certain circumstances granting RFRA
exemptions from rules of general applicability based on objectors' "complicity-
based conscience claims" can pose special dangers of imposing "material and
dignitary harms" on third parties.5 NeJaime and Siegel contend that this point
is relevant to determining whether a rule of general applicability, when applied
to a particular objector, serves a compelling governmental interest and is the
least restrictive means of furthering that interest.
NeJaime and Siegel consider complicity-based claims in the context of
antidiscrimination law. Because the government enacts such laws to protect
individual and social interests that have both material and expressive
dimensions, NeJaime and Siegel contend that
[i]f religious accommodation (1) would inflict material or dignitary
harm on those the statute is designed to protect or (2) would produce
effects and meanings that undermine the government's society-wide
objectives, this impact is evidence that unimpaired enforcement of the
law is the least restrictive means of furthering the government's
*6interest.
It is to this formulation that Laycock strenuously and primarily objects.
Laycock believes that NeJaime and Siegel's conclusion is blatantly
inconsistent with First Amendment rights of freedom of expression. At times
he asserts that NeJaime and Siegel would deny religious accommodations
because a claimant engages in political speech.7 But this is not what NeJaime
4. 4 2 U.S.C. § 20oobb-1(a)-(b).
5. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 2, at 2519-20.
6. Id. at 258o.
7. See Laycock, supra note 3, at 371 ("Because these conscientious objectors engage in a political
argument, they lose their right to conscientious objection."); see also id. at 369 ("They
appear to say that religious conservatives should forfeit their right to conscientious objection
on these issues because too many of them also engage in political speech on these issues.");
id. at 372 ("Religious conservatives do not forfeit their right to conscientious objection by
maling political arguments about the laws they object to, and they do not forfeit their right
to make political arguments by involing their right to conscientious objection."). NeJaime
and Siegel do not actually make such a claim; instead they emphasize that claimants should
always have available the First Amendment rights of speech that all other members of
society possess. See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 2, at 2584 ("If the accommodation does not
obstruct the attainment of any compelling governmental ends, then RFRA directs
accommodation of the claim. If such an accommodation cannot be devised, RFRA allows
the government to pursue its compelling interests through unobstructed enforcement of the
statute. Yet even in these circumstances, the religious claimant has resources for expressing
concerns of conscience and for advocating change of religiously objectionable laws. The
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and Siegel argue. They instead seek only to implement the literal provisions of
RFRA; they ask whether granting a RFRA accommodation will in any
particular case prevent a generally applicable statute from fulfilling the
compelling governmental interests that underwrite it. In the context of
antidiscrimination law, these interests can include values like equal citizenship
and the prevention of dignitary harm.
Laycock seems to believe that protecting these governmental interests are
inconsistent with First Amendment values. He asserts that if "preventing...
'meanings' and 'values' communicated by conscientious objection "is a
compelling government interest," then conscientious objectors would in effect
"lose their right to conscientious objection" whenever they engaged "in a
political argument."" His rhetoric is on this point is unsparing:
This is indefensible. Religious conservatives are absolutely entitled
to argue for their views on the regulation of sex, however mistaken
some of those views may be. And their exercise of that right is not a
ground for forfeiting other rights they may have, including their right
to religious exemptions.
And if these acts of conscience are.., a form of political speech, as
NeJaime and Siegel argue, then the acts of conscience are doubly
protected.
• . . The government cannot justify restrictions on discriminatory
expressive conduct with the goal of "produc[ing] a society free of the
corresponding biases." That would be "a decidedly fatal objective."9
Laycock's argument turns on how First Amendment rights of freedom of
expression intersect with claim for religious exemptions under RFRA. His
argument raises complex and difficult issues about how communicative rights
should be conceptualized in the context of RFRA. In analyzing his argument, I
use the term "First Amendment rights" to refer exclusively to First Amendment
rights of freedom of expression.
claimant has at her disposal all of the resources of speech and political advocacy available to
others in the society, but does not have the special advantage of an exemption from
complying with the law.").
8. Laycock, supra note 3, at 371.
9. Id. at 371, 373 (citations omitted). I should say that NeJaime and Siegel seem to have a rather
different understanding of their argument than that advanced by Laycock in this passage.
See, e.g., NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 2, at 2584.
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II. COVERAGE VERSUS PROTECTION
At the outset, we should distinguish First Amendment coverage from First
Amendment protection.1" First Amendment coverage exists whenever the
constitutionality of a government action must be determined by the distinctive
doctrinal tests of First Amendment jurisprudence. First Amendment
protection, by contrast, refers to whether these doctrinal tests permit or
invalidate that government action. It is quite common for a statute to trigger
First Amendment coverage and yet to survive constitutional scrutiny.11 Most
forms of government action, however, do not raise questions of First
Amendment validity, and consequently their constitutionality is not
determined by the application of doctrines specific to First Amendment
jurisprudence. With regard to such actions, there is no First Amendment
coverage.
The question of First Amendment coverage is theoretically fundamental: it
forces us to decide whether we face an issue that should trigger distinct First
Amendment tests and doctrines. First Amendment coverage can be triggered in
either of two ways: by the nature of the behavior that government seeks to
regulate or by the purpose that government regulation seeks to advance.12 shall
discuss each of these in order.
A. The Behavior Regulated by Government
Government regulation typically triggers First Amendment coverage if
government seeks to control a speaker's ability to participate in a medium for
the communication of ideas.13 But government regulation typically does not
trigger First Amendment coverage merely because someone engages in
behavior that happens to be expressive.4
So, for example, if persons are prosecuted for defacing public property by
graffiti, the proscribed behavior does not trigger First Amendment coverage
even though it is expressive. If terrorists use their crimes to communicate
political messages, they do not thereby acquire the right to a First Amendment
defense when they are prosecuted. If a manufacturer sells a product with
inadequate warnings, it cannot cite First Amendment precedents to defend
against tort liability, even though the adequacy of its warnings may depend
10. ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE & ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 1-5 (2012).
11. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2OO).
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upon their expressive content. Nor can a landlord rely upon the First
Amendment to defend against a prosecution for violating a rent control
ordinance, even though the landlord's infraction may turn on meanings
contained in a lease. In each of these examples, First Amendment coverage is
not triggered by expressive conduct.
NeJaime and Siegel orient their article around the recent case of Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.i" In Hobby Lobby, the owners of a closely held
corporation challenged Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
regulations requiring employers to offer employees health-insurance coverage
for certain methods of contraception. The owners of the Hobby Lobby Stores,
David and Barbara Green and their children, objected to covering "four FDA-
approved contraceptives that may operate after the fertilization of an egg,,,6
because they regarded the provision of such insurance as approving and
enabling abortion.17
It is plain that HHS could enforce its regulations against the Green family
without triggering First Amendment coverage. The Greens would have no
plausible First Amendment defense against government sanctions for refusing
to offer the mandated insurance coverage. It is irrelevant that the Greens regard
the insurance as expressing approval for abortion, just as it is irrelevant to the
prosecution of a terrorist that he believes that his crime expresses opposition to
the American government. From the First Amendment perspective, the HHS
regulations simply regulate conduct.
I expect that this same doctrinal conclusion would apply to most of the
circumstances that are at issue in the debate between Laycock and NeJaime and
Siegel. Requiring that bakers or landlords not discriminate against patrons is
paradigmatically categorized as a simple regulation of conduct. It does not
matter whether the owner of an inn regards leasing rooms as expressive; First
Amendment coverage is not triggered by the application of a general rule
requiring landlords to lease rooms without discrimination.1" First Amendment
doctrine does not conceive these kinds of conduct regulations as preventing or
inhibiting expression, political or otherwise.
Those subject to antidiscrimination laws are of course always free to make
whatever political arguments they wish. This freedom is securely guaranteed
by the First Amendment. But they are not free to engage in conduct the law
otherwise prohibits. This also holds true for the Greens, who are free to engage
in political advocacy whether or not the HHS regulations are enforced. From
the perspective of the First Amendment, the HHS regulations have nothing to
15. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
16. Id. at 2765.
17. Id. at 2759.
18. Cf. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 5o8 U.S. 476 (1993) (upholding enhanced penalties for a crime
committed because of a the victim's race).
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do with political advocacy. That is why the Greens would not have a First
Amendment defense were they to refuse to offer the mandated insurance
coverage.
One can make this point more concretely. Imagine a case in which
government seeks to regulate participation in a medium for the communication
of ideas. It prohibits publishing magazines without a license. Imagine that a
person seeks to publish a religious magazine that is essential to the practice of
her religion. She could challenge the proposed government ordinance under
either the First Amendment or RFRA. Because there are many advantages to
claiming constitutional rather than statutory rights, we can expect her to
invoke RFRA only if her First Amendment claims are weak. In the hypothetical
case about a religious magazine, it would be astonishing if a person even
bothered to invoke RFRA; because the government is regulating an expressive
medium, there is an underlying First Amendment freedom at play. First
Amendment coverage is obviously triggered. Conversely, in cases like Hobby
Lobby, RFRA alone is involved precisely because there is no underlying First
Amendment right to prevent the federal government from requiring employers
to insure their employees.
It is therefore difficult to make sense of Laycock's rhetoric. He is of course
completely right to assert that "[r]eligious conservatives are constitutionally
entitled to argue for their views on the regulation of sex."19 But that assertion
does not seem to have anything to do with the question before us, which is
whether RFRA should be interpreted to apply to conduct that is otherwise
without First Amendment coverage. The HHS regulations do not prevent
anyone from arguing about anything. The RFRA question arises only because
the conduct at stake is precisely not "a form of political speech."'2 If it were a
form of political speech, there would be a far more direct way to provide legal
protection than RFRA.
Laycock's invocation of Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston, Inc.,2 is thus mysterious. Hurley involved the application of a
Massachusetts antidiscrimination statute to a parade, which the Court
regarded (and has traditionally regarded) as a "medium for the communication
of ideas,"' or, as Justice Souter put it, "a form of expression, not just
19. Laycock, supra note 3, at 371.
20. Id. at 373-74.
21. 515 U.S. 557 (1995); see Laycock, supra note 3, at 373, 377.
22. Post, supra note 12, at 1255-6o.
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motion."'23 First Amendment coverage is typically triggered whenever the state
seeks to regulate media for the communication of ideas.'
Hurley explicitly contrasts statutes that regulate media for the
communication of ideas with antidiscrimination laws that regulate only
conduct. Hurley affirms the constitutionality of antidiscrimination laws that
prohibit "the act of discriminating against individuals in the provision of
publicly available goods, privileges, and services on the proscribed grounds."5
Such laws are "well within the State's usual power to enact when a legislature
has reason to believe that a given group is the target of discrimination, and
they do not, as a general matter, violate the First or Fourteenth
Amendments.' '26 The applications of RFRA that NeJaime and Siegel consider,
and that Laycock discusses,7 are analogous. They involve the regulation of
ordinary forms of conduct, rather than of media for the communication of
ideas.
Laycock's appeal to Hurley seems decidedly misplaced, as afortiori does his
appeal to the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.8 NeJaime and Siegel's
interpretation of RFRA does not require the waiver of any First Amendment
right.
B. The Purpose of Government Regulation
We might rehabilitate Laycock's First Amendment argument if we
remember that First Amendment coverage can be triggered when the state acts
for constitutionally suspicious reasons, regardless of whether it seeks to
regulate media for the communication of ideas.9 Thus the famous R.A.V. case
held that a statute that proscribes only fighting words, which are without First
Amendment coverage, may nevertheless be vulnerable to constitutional
challenge if its purpose is to exercise "hostility-or favoritism- towards the
underlying message expressed."3 Laycock appears to interpret NeJaime and
Siegel as reading into RFRA just such hostility toward the beliefs of religious
persons. Laycock may believe that NeJaime and Siegel run afoul of the First
23. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568 ("Real '[p]arades are public dramas of social relations, and in them
performers define who can be a social actor and what subjects and ideas are available for
communication and consideration."' (citations omitted)).
24. See Post, supra note 12.
25. 515 U.S. at 572.
26. Id.
27. Laycock, supra note 3, at 386 (describing "[a] merchant who refuses service for reasons of
conscience").
28. Id. at 372.
29. Post, supra note 12, at 1254-6o.
30. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992).
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Amendment because they seek to apply RFRA in a way that advances
constitutionally improper purposes.
Determining which government purposes trigger First Amendment
coverage often raises profound and complex questions. But this is not the case
with respect to Nejaime and Siegel's argument. Their thesis, in a nutshell,
amounts to nothing more than a restatement of RFRA's explicit provisions,
which direct courts not to grant religious exemptions from generally applicable
statutes insofar as such statutes serve compelling interests and insofar as
granting exemptions would undermine those interests. They believe that
RFRA should be interpreted in light of the interests served by the general
statute to which RFRA applies.
In Nejaime and Siegel's argument, therefore, as in RFRA itself, there is a
constitutional identity between the purposes erved by RFRA and the purposes
served by the statutes of general applicability to which RFRA applies. It
follows that if the interests served by a generally applicable statute do not
trigger First Amendment coverage, interpreting RFRA to advance those same
interests should also not trigger First Amendment coverage. Someone who
wishes to argue that interpreting RFRA to serve the interests of a generally
applicable statute should trigger First Amendment coverage must be
committed to the proposition that First Amendment coverage should also
triggered by the application of the statute itself
This symmetry has important implications for RFRA in the context of the
antidiscrimination laws that lie at the heart of Nejaime and Siegel's article. A
fundamental purpose of antidiscrimination law is to prevent "the deprivation
of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public
establishments."31 Because the law commonly conceptualizes the dignity of
persons as dependent upon how they are regarded by others,32 legal efforts to
uphold dignity typically have the purpose and effect of regulating conduct that
transmits messages of disrespect. That is why antidiscrimination law
characteristically prohibits conduct that creates social meanings associated with
the stigmatization or stereotyping of protected groups.
Consider, for example, how the Court understands the purpose of a
Minnesota antidiscrimination statute:
By prohibiting gender discrimination in places of public
accommodation, the Minnesota Act protects the State's citizenry from a
31. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (quoting S. REP. No.
88-872, at 16-17 (1964)).
32. See Joel Feinberg, The Nature and Value of Rights, 4 J. VALUE INQUIRY 243, 252 (1970); Robert
C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Se/f in the Common Law Tort, 77
CALIF. L. REv. 957, 964-75 (1989); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations ofDefamation Law:
Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 691, 707-19 (1986).
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number of serious social and personal harms. In the context of
reviewing state actions under the Equal Protection Clause, this Court
has frequently noted that discrimination based on archaic and
overbroad assumptions about the relative needs and capacities of the
sexes forces individuals to labor under stereotypical notions that often
bear no relationship to their actual abilities. It thereby both deprives
persons of their individual dignity and denies society the benefits of
wide participation in political, economic, and cultural life. These
concerns are strongly implicated with respect to gender discrimination
in the allocation of publicly available goods and services.33
This point can be generalized. Whenever law seeks to alter the social status
of a group, it will regulate conduct that transmits meanings inconsistent with
the desired status. Consider, for example, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for
the Court in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, which upheld the
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).A The FMLA was not on its face an
antidiscrimination law, yet its purpose was to alter the status of women. The
Chief Justice applauded the efforts of Congress to transform
"[t]he prevailing ideology about women's roles [that] has in turn
justified discrimination against women when they are mothers or
mothers-to-be." Stereotypes about women's domestic roles are
reinforced by parallel stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic
responsibilities for men. Because employers continued to regard the
family as the woman's domain, they often denied men similar
accommodations or discouraged them from taking leave. These
mutually reinforcing stereotypes created a self-fulfilling cycle of
discrimination that forced women to continue to assume the role of
primary family caregiver, and fostered employers' stereotypical views
about women's commitment to work and their value as employees.
Those perceptions, in turn, Congress reasoned, lead to subtle
discrimination that may be difficult to detect on a case-by-case basis.
We believe that Congress' chosen remedy, the family-care leave
provision of the FMLA, is "congruent and proportional to the targeted
violation.""
The regulation of conduct to prevent the transmission of social meaning is
so pervasive that the Court has interpreted even the Equal Protection Clause
itself as protecting "the dignity and worth" of individuals,36 and hence, as the
33. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 6o9, 625 (1984) (citations omitted).
34. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
35. Id. at 736-37 (citation omitted).
36. Ricev. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000).
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Court explained in JEB v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,3 7 as regulating behavior
conveying "discriminatory and stereotypical presumptions that reflect and
reinforce patterns of historical discrimination":
Striking individual jurors on the assumption that they hold particular
views simply because of their gender is "practically a brand upon them,
affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority." It denigrates the
dignity of the excluded juror, and, for a woman, reinvokes a history of
exclusion from political participation. The message it sends to all those
in the courtroom, and all those who may later learn of the
discriminatory act, is that certain individuals, for no reason other than
gender, are presumed unqualified by state actors to decide important
questions upon which reasonable persons could disagree.8
NeJaime and Siegel believe that in applying RFRA to laws that seek to alter
the social status of groups, it is relevant whether granting a religious
exemption would "inflict material or dignitary harm on those the statute is
designed to protect or... would produce effects and meanings that undermine
the government's ociety-wide objectives."39 This is merely to argue that RFRA
should be interpreted to allow exemptions from laws only if such exemptions
do not defeat the purpose of such laws. It is simply to restate the explicit terms
of RFRA.40 It follows that if Laycock believes that interpreting RFRA in this
way triggers First Amendment coverage, then he must also believe that First
Amendment scrutiny is triggered by statutes that seek to transform the social
status of groups.
This is a highly ambitious but most implausible claim. It would suggest
that our entire tradition of antidiscrimination law is suspect under the First
Amendment. Sometimes Laycock seems to embrace this wide-ranging claim, as
when he states that "The Court has already closed the door on 'social meaning'
as a compelling government interest."4 1 In the context of antidiscrimination
law, Laycock's assertion is plainly and manifestly false, especially so when his
authority for this startling proposition is Hurley. And yet at other times
Laycock seems to reject such a radical position, as when he argues "I do not
claim that civil-rights laws generally violate the Free Speech Clause, as Robert
Post seems to think. It is NeJaime and Siegel, not me, who say that these
37. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
38. Id. at 141-42 (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted).
39. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 2, at 258o.
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 2ooobb-1(b) (2o2).
41. Laycock, supra note 3, at 373.
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claims of conscientious objection are a form of political speech in support of the
conservative religious position on the underlying issues."'
The logical difficulties that beset Laycock's argument suggest how cautious
we must be in interpreting a case like R.A.V. Almost all human behavior is
saturated with meaning, and for that reason law frequently seeks to regulate
conduct precisely because of its meaning.43 Criminal law illustrates the point."
Antidiscrimination law is not exceptional in this regard. If we take a decision
like R.A.V. too literally, and if we seek to strike down laws because they seek to
repress certain (harmful) messages communicated by acts that lie outside
media for the communication of ideas, we endanger large swaths of our
existing legal system.
CONCLUSION
The great tradition of American First Amendment jurisprudence did not
arise from striking down laws that sought to regulate conduct because of its
social meaning. It instead focused on laws that sought to regulate participation
in media for the communication of ideas. Without denying the validity of a
case like R.A.V. ,4 there is a deep puzzle about how exactly to generalize its
holding.46 I have elsewhere advocated that we should do so through forms of
reflective equilibrium,4 7 by inquiring carefully into the consequences of our
formulation of First Amendment principles and their compatibility with
fundamental constitutional and social commitments. It should count
powerfully and persuasively against any abstract or rigid formulation of First
Amendment principles that it would invalidate our entire tradition of
antidiscrimination law.
I acknowledge that such modesty is in tension with the First Amendment
literalism that seems recently to have gripped those with a strong deregulatory
agenda.48 But I would be very surprised to learn that Laycock believes
antidiscrimination law should be constitutionally invalidated because it seeks
to maintain human dignity by regulating conduct that promulgates harmful
meanings stigmatizing to protected groups. Were Laycock to embrace such an
42. Id. at 373-74.
43. See generally Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943
(1995).
44. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD.
609 (1998).
45. Or consider a case like Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
46. See Lessig, supra note 43.
47. See POST, supra note io, at 5-6.
48. See Amanda Shanor & Robert Post, Adam Smith's First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REv. F. 165
(2015).
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extreme position, he would need to offer a great deal more justification than
what is presently contained in his Response. Without it, he is not yet entitled
to the indignant tone in which he couches his First Amendment contentions.
How broadly or narrowly we should apply RFRA is a different question on
which I take no position. I am concerned only with Laycock's argument that
NeJaime and Siegel's thesis is unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
And the precise answer to Laycock's argument is that NeJaime and Siegel's
thesis is neither more nor less unconstitutional than the antidiscrimination
statutes to which RFRA is being applied. If the interests served by
antidiscrimination law do not trigger First Amendment coverage, then neither
should interpreting RFRA to effectuate these interests. Conversely, if Laycock
truly considers NeJaime and Siegel's thesis to be "indefensible," then so must
he consider the many antidiscrimination statutes that are now subject to
RFRA's knife.
This same logic applies to the HHS mandate at issue in Hobby Lobby. The
mandate serves a number of possible interests. If the primary interest is to
protect the health of women, then it is difficult to understand how any First
Amendment issue can arise from interpreting RFRA to advance this interest.
RFRA states that it should not be interpreted to authorize exemptions that
undermine the achievement of a compelling purpose like women's health.
If the HHS mandate is instead understood to serve the purpose of altering
"stereotypical views" about women's reproductive functions, the mandate must
be conceptualized as transformative in the same way that Hibbs interpreted the
FMLA to be. If Laycock's real argument is that interpreting RFRA to advance
such a transformative social purpose ought to trigger First Amendment
scrutiny, then his true disagreement lies with Hibbs and its approval of statutes
like the FMLA. His true disagreement lies with a main purpose of our
traditional antidiscrimination law.
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